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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
P. S. GUSS, dba PHOTO SOUND
PRODUCTS MANUFACTURING
COMPANY,
Appellant,
-vs.UTAH LABOR RELATIONS
BOARD and UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA, CIO,
Respondents.

Case No.
8393

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
To supplement appellant's Statement of Facts, the
respondent adopts Trial Examiner Robert J. Shaughnessy's Intermediate Report, upon which the Utah State
Labor Board based its Findings of Fact and Order
(Record, 316) :
HISTORY OF THE CASE-JURISDICTION
The Respondent*, Phillip B. Guss, dba Photo Sound
Manufacturing Company, zs engaged in the manufac1
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tttre of specialized equipment for the United States A.ir
Force on a contract basis. The amount of these contracts
with the Govern1nent or it$ agencies totaled $152,025.50.
On December 1, 1953, the Pf3titioner herein filed a
Petition (Bd. Exhibit No. 1) for Certification of Representatives with the National Labor Relations Board
involving the employees of the Respondent. Pursuant
to this Petition, an Agreement for consent election (Bd.
Exhibit No. 3) was signed, an Election condu.cted on
April 26, 1954, a. Tally of Ballots issued April 26, 1954
and q Qertificatiqn of Representativ~s dated May 4, 1954.
All of the foregQi·ng was handled by and throu9h the
National Labor E;elations Board, ~Oth 8cgior,~;.

*At the hearing below Photo Sound Products Manufacturing
Company (the Appellant herein) is designated as the Respondent,
and United Steel-Workelis of America, CIO (the R.espondent
herein) was designated as the Claimant and Petitioner in the
hearing below.

After a series of attempts at negotiating a contract
bJ~ the Petitioner and Respondent, an Unfair Labor
Practice Charge (Resp. Exhibit No.7) was filed against
the Respondent by the Petitioner on May 17, 1954. Following the filing of this Charge, t·he Acting Regional
Director of the 20th Region of the N.L.R.B. issued a
letter (Comp. Exhibit No. 9) dated July· 21, 1954, in
which he declared, "Further proceedings are not warranted, inasmuch as the operations of the Company involv~d are predominantly local in character, and it does
not appear that it would effectuate tke polici·es of the
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Act to exercise jurisdiction. I am, therefore, refusing
to issue complaint in this matter." No appeal or other
proceedings were taken thereafter by either party and
the decision became final.
Following this decision, the Petitioner filed charges
with the Utah Labor Relations Board alleging in substance the same matters as filed before the N.L.R.B.
The Petitioner's position is t-hat the refusal of the
N.L.R.B. to act confers jurisdiction on this Board to
act. The Respondent's position is that the employer is
in fact engaged in interstate commerce, subject to the
N.L.R.B. and by Federal preemption in this field, the
Utah Labor Relations Board cannot act.
It must be conceded that the Respondent is manufacturing products almost all of which are shipped outside the State of Utah. It is also true that a large amount
of the dollars expended in performing these contracts
are spent for labor. and the purchase of materials on a
local level. It is thus apparent that intrastate commerce
as well as interstate commerce is affected by this dispute.
It is important that consideration must be given to
the ract that in the original representation proceeding
the Certification was issued on the basis of a "consent
Election." In this proceeding there was no administrative or judicial determination by the N.L.R.B. or its
agents that the Respondent's operation was sufficient
to warrant the N.L.R.B. to assume jurisdiction. The
parties merely agreed that they were subject to the
National Labor Relations Act.

3
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Pursuant to the filing of the Unfair Labor Practice
Charge by the Co·mplainant before the N.L.R.B., the
fi'rst expression of a.dministrative determination of the
question of jurisdiction occurred when the Regional
Director of the N.L.R.B. stated ... "the operations of
the Company involved are predominately local in character, and it does not appear that it would effectuate
the policies of the Act to exercise jurisdiction." It appears that here we have an expression by a lack of jurisdiction on the part of the N.L.R.B. and such expression
became final when no appeal was taken. The N.L.R.B.
and the parties to this proceeding apparently agreed
that t·he activities of the Respondent are primarily local
in character. The Hearing Referee must agree.
As was stated by our Supreme Court in Utah Labor
Relations Board vs. Utah Valley Hospital, 235 Pac. 2d

520:
"It would seem paradoxical indeed to hold
as defendant urges us to do, that the hospital
is beyond the control of the Utah Legislature because it is controlled by an Act of Congress,
which by its very terms excludes the hospital
from its operation."
As was aptly pointed out by the New York State
Labor Relations Board in a somewhat similar situation
in the case of Matter of B.F.O.E. of the United States
vs. N.Y.S.L.R.B., 17 /::;.L.R.B. 61:
"Exclusi(, n of organizations such as Respon-dents from the coverage of the Act: " ... would
not immunize them from labor disputes, for it
4
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would not deprive the employees of the right to
join a union or to engage in concerted activities.
The sole effect would be to make unavailable the
procedures for peaceful adjustments of labor disputes, whic-h the Legislature has provided in the
Act, and regulate the employees to economic
action to obtain recognition and negotiations. The
purpose of the Act is to substitute the peaceful
procedures provided therein for the economic
warfare which results from the refusal of employers engaged in commercial activities to
negotiate with the representatives of their employees.''
The Hearing Examiner must, therefore, conclude
that the business of t~he Respondent affects intrastate
co1nmerce, or the orderly operation of industry within
the State of Utah, and since the N.L.R.B. has refused
jurisdiction, therefore the Utah Labor Relations Board
has jurisdiction.
THE Ul!·lF AIR LABOR PRACTICES
1.

THE DISCHARGES.

1. Charles Illsley was employed by the Respondent
tn October of 1953. The following month he signed a
union a~tthorization card. He became active immediately
in promoting the Union among fellow employees. He
acted as the Union observer at the time of the N.L.R.B.
election. He later became a member of the Union negotiating committee and grievance committee. He participated in virt~tally all negotiations that were held between the Company and the Union until negotiations
5
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ceased. Illsley was discharged in August 1954 after
negotiations had broken off and the N.L.R.B. had refused to issue a comp.laint.
After the advent of the organization campaign it
seems from all the evidence. that a general attitude of
anti-union conduct developed on the part of management towards the ·infant union. Negotiations were not
satisfactory. The Respondent failed to give proper attention to the request of the Union for meetings or discussions on grievances. Since Mr. Illsley was spearheading the Union movement in all these fields, it follows
that because of the general anti-union attitude of theRespondent they were most anxious to see him discharged.
In point of seniority in his classification he w·as t·he
oldest employee of the Respondent. His successor was
another employee of the Respondent that did not work
for Photo Sound but an entirely separate operation that
the Respondent maintained elsewhere.
The Referee finds and conc.ludes that Charles Illsley
was discharged solely because of his activities for and
on behalf of the complainant Union.

2. Gary Watrous was employed as a clerk and stock
record keeper in the production shop and had been so
emp.loyed since July 15, 1953. Mr. Watrous had attended
a 1neeting of the Union at which the Respondent's manager, Mr. Garber, spoke. He had 1net in cars outside
Respondent's place of business with the Union Representative, Mr. Mullet, and had been observed by Mr. Garber, who also knew the occupation and purpose of Mr.

6
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llf.nllet. After obta-ining permission for a two-week leave
of absence for active duty with the Navy, the applicant
found on his return that he had been replaced by someone from some other operation carried on by Mr. Guss.
Prior to his departure for the Navy, Mr. Watrous had
been questioned by Mr. Gerber as to how he had voted
in the election. As will later appear, Mr. Gerber was
known as being opposed to the Union.
The Referee finds and concludes that Mr. Watrous
had been discharged for his activities for and on behalf
of the Union.

* * * *
5. Victor Sismondi was employed ~n October of
1953 and discharged in April of 1954. The management
of the Respondent advised him that he had been discharged for sloppy work. Apparently a number of valves
were not properly cut and Sismondi was blamed for this
error. Sismondi's activities in connection with the Union
consisted primarily in signing a union designation card
and distributing cards to other employees. He met with
the Union Representative on a number of occasions and
attended meetings with other employees. Hrz~s employment lasted seven months. It seems difficult to the Referee to employ a 1nachinist for such a period and at
that tin~e discover that he was not qualified to do the
job. Such a shortcoming seems reasonab.le to determine
after a few weeks of employment let alone seven months.
It would appear that management had knowledge of the
fact that Sismondi was a member of the Union and at
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best picked a poor time to discharge him immediately
prior to the election.
In consideration of the entire attitude of the Respondent towards the Union in general and to certain of
the employees who were defin·itely active on behalf of
the Union, it is the finding of the undersigned that Victor
Sismondi was discharged for Union activity.
The Union made a claim on behalf of Clisbee
Lyman, another mem,ber of the Union, that he was discharged for Union activities, but the most that can be
said for this was the evidence was entirely hearsay and
none of a substantial nature on which a finding could be
based. The Trial Examiner concludes that there is no
ev·idence to support a finding that Clisbee Lyman was
discharged for activities associated with t·h~e Union.
6.

7. The Union disclaimed any interest in Max Whitman, one of the employees named in the Complaint and
Charge and therefore the Complaint should be dismissed
as to him.
2.

THE INTERFERENCE WITH THE RIGHTS OF THE
EMPLOYEES.

The record shows from the outset a long series of
instances by the Respondent or his representatives in
making statements to individual employees and to the
employees as a group that tended to interfere with their
right to make a free choice of their bargaining representative. In the fact of this discrimination and intimidation of the e1nployees, the employees neverthe8
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less designated the United Steelworkers of America as
their bargaining agent.
The Trial Exan~iner must conclude from the evidence submitted that in the face of threats of reprisal
if the election showed a majority for t·he Union, the
employees overcame such threats and designated the
Union as their bargaining representative. Thus the question of interference becomes moot.

3. THE REFUSAL TO BARGAIN.
Fallowing the Certification by the N.L.R.B. the
Union requested an immediate meeting for the purpose
of negotiating a contract. A number of letters and phone
calls were made, meetings set and cancelled until finally
an Unfair Labor Practice Charge was filed with the

N.L.R.B.
Following this a meeting was held on June 1, 1954
tn the office of the Respondent's attorney, Peter M.
B·illings. Mr. Rasmussen, the Union's representative,
supplied a proposed contract on behalf of the Union and
represented bhat the matter was open for negotiations.
Mr. Rasmussen also provided a proposed interim agreement for handling grievances. The matter was discussed
generally with reference to general matters in the contract.
Another meetinq was held J1~ne 23, 1954 and at this
meeting the interim agreement for handling grievances
was signed. Shortly thereafter, the Respondent's attorney left town and did not return until August 11, 1954

9
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at which time he found a letter from the Union requesting a meeting either the 11th, 12th or 13th of August.
At the same time, th.e Respondent and his Attorney received word from the N.L.R.B. that they would not assume jurisdiction of the u.nfair labor practice charge
previously filed by the Union.
In the face of a request for a meeting to negotiate
the contract by t·he Union on any one of three days, the
Respondent ignored the request and by Counsel's own
statement decided ''that the Steelworkers were dropping
the matter of negotiation, because we had no further
reqttest." From this time on, in spite of an open request
for bargaining sessions, the Respondent ·made no furthe:r
effort to contact either the Steelworker's Union or a
member of the negotiating committee of Respondent's
place of business.
The Trail Examiner can only conclude that after
the N.L.R.B. decision, the Respondents had no further
intention of meeting or attempting to negotiate a contract. It must also be found that the request for meetings were reasonable as to number, tim-e and place. For
these reasons t-h;e record supports a finding that the Respondent has since on or before refused to bargain
collectively with the duly designated representative of
their employees.
The Trial Examiner then recommended, and the
Utah Labor Relations Board ordered:
1. Phil S. Guss dba Photo Sound Products Mfg.
Co. cease and desist from refusing to bargain collectively

10
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with United Steelworkers of America as the exclusive
bargaining representative of his employees e1nployed at
his place of business, 264 East 1st Sout·h, Salt Lake City,
Utah, in respect to rates of pay, hours of employment
and other conditions of employ1nent.
2. Take the following affirmative action which the
Trial Examiner finds is necessary to effectuate the
policies of the Act:

U pan request, bargain collectively with
United Steelworrkers of America as the exclusive
bargaining representative of his employees employed by the Respondent at 264 East 1st South,
Salt Lake City, Utah, in respect to rates of pay,
hours of employment and other conditions of employment.
(a)

Upon application, either personally or
through~ their bargaining representative, immediately
and fully reinstate Charles Ills ley, Gary Watrous
and Charles Sismondi to their former positions with
Respondent held by them prior to the dates of their
discharge without prejudice to any rights or privileges previously enjoyed by each of them, discharging, if necessary, any person or persons employed
in the place of each since their discharge.
(b)

(c) Make whole each of the employees named
in paragraph (b) above for any loss of wages that
may have occurred from the time of their discharge
until they are fully reinstated. Employwr to receive

11
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credit for all earnings from all sources during the
time between the date of their discharge and the
time of their reinstatement.
Post i1rl/mediately, in plain sight, and leave
posted for a per,iod of thirty consecutive days from
the first day of posting, in a conspicious place in
Respondent's premises, a copy of the Board's Order
together with an appropriate notice to its employees
in a form to be determined by the Board.
(d)

Notwithstanding the Labor Board's mandate, the
employer ignored the entire order, resting his refusal
upon the ground the National Labor Relations Board
has exclusive jurisdiction of his employment activities.
STATEMENT OF POINT'S
The question presented here is whether the Utah
State Labor Relations. Board may take a case affecting
interstate commerce after the National Labor Relations
Board has declined to decide the controversy because of
its jurisdictional policy.
POINT. I
RESPONDENTS CONCEDE THERE HAS BEEN NO
CESSION OF JURISDICTION FROM THE NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS BOARD TO THE UTAH STATE LABOR
RELATIONS BOARD AS PROVIDED BY SECTION 10 (a),
LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947.
POINT II
THE UTAH STATE LABOR RELA:TIONS B·OARD
SHOULD HAVE THE POWER TO ACT IF THE NATIONAL

12
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LABOR RELATIONS
JURISDI·CTION.

BOARD

DECLINES

TO

ASSERT

POINT III
UNLESS THE STATE ACTS IN THIS INSTANCE, A
VACUUM IN THE LAW IS CREATED WHICH MAY RESULT IN ACTIVITIES PROHIBITED BY BOTH STATE
AND FEDERAL LAW.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
RESPONDENTS CONCEDE THERE HAS BEEN NO
CESSION OF JURISDICTION FROM THE NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS BOARD TO 'THE UTAH S'TATE LABOR
RELATIONS BOARD AS PROVIDED BY SECTION lO(a),
LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947.

Section 10(a), Labor Management Relations Act
authorizes the National Labor Relations Board to cede
to any state or territorial agency "jurisdiction over any
cases in any industry * * * even though such cases may
involve labor disputes affecting (interstate) commerce
* * * ." In a 1954 decision the United States Supreme
Court quoted an N.L.R.B. memorandum filed at the request of the Sup rente Court:
"It is not feasible under the limitations prescribed by the Act to consummate ceding agreements to any states under the proviso."

United Construction Workers v. Laburnum Corporation) 347 U.S. 656, (1954) Footnote 2.
The limitations mentioned by the National Labor
Relations Board involve the fact that no state has copied
the National Labor Management Relations Act. The
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re~ult is that state labor relations laws are sufficiently

inconsistent with the Labor Management Relations Act
to preclude cessions agreements. The situation mentioned in the memorandum remains unchanged. For a
state board's comments on resultant problems, see the
discussion of New York Labor Relations Board (1949)
Annual Report, 26 Labor Relations Reference Manual
69.
Respondents, therefore, concede there has been no
cession of jurisdiction from the National Labor Relations Board to the Utah State Labor Board, and under the circumstances of this case, cession is not necessary.
POINT II
THE UT·AH STATE LABOR REL~TIQ.NS BOARD
SHOULD HAVE THE POWER TO ACT IF THE NATIONAL
LABOR RELA:TIONS BOARD DECLINES TO ASSERT
JURIS.DI·GTION.

The single question presented before this Court for
decision is whether the Utah State Labor Relations
Board may take jurisdiction of a labor matter affecting
interstate commerce when the National Labor Relations
Board has declined jurisdiction because of budgetary or
other administrative reasons. The issue is a novel one,
having never been decided by this tribunal or the United
States Supreme Court-appellant's authorities to the
contrary, notwithstanding. In Bethlehem Steel Corporation v. New York Labor Relations Board, 330 U.S. 767
(1946), the United States Supreme Court stated :
"The election of the National Board to decline
jurisdiction in certain types of cases, for budget-
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ary or other reasons, presents a different problem which we do not now decide." (Emphasis
added.)

In LaCross Telephone Corporation v. W.E.R.B.,
336 U.S. 18 (1949), the Supreme Court did not pass upon
the effect of a discretionary declination of jurisdiction
by the National Board. The court in Gardner v. Teamsters G & H Union, 346 U.S. 485 (1953), held there was
no
"suggestion that respondents plea of federal
jurisdiction and pre-emption was frivolous and
dilatory, or that the federal board would decline
to exercise its powers once its jurisdiction was
invoked."
As recently as 1954, the United States Supreme Court
in the case of Building Trades Council v. Kinard Construction Co., 346 U.S. 933, held in a per curium decision:
"Since there has been no clear showing that
respondent has applied to the National Labor
Relations Board for appropriate relief, or that
it would be futile to do so, the court does not
pass upon the question suggested by the opinion
below on whether the State court could grant its
own relief should the Board decline to exercise
its jurisdiction."
Since the Kinard holding there have been no decisions by the United States Supreme Court on this point
and as of this date ihe issue at hand is without a prior
conclusive precedent.
Appellant has placed great wejght upon the Bethle.
hem, LaCross and Garner cases, supra, in support of
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its position. Those cases involved facts creative of
potential or direct conflict of state and federal action
as distinguished from the situation at hand. Explaining
its denial of the concurrent federal-state jurisdiction
theory urged by the states in the Bethlehem case, the
LaCross court held that:
"the situation [was] too fraught with potential
conflict to pernrit the intrusion of the state agency
even though the National Board had not acted in
the particular cases * • * . [If the National Board
and a state board take jurisdiction of the same
labor matter, the] uncertainty as to which board
is master and how long it will remain such can
be as disruptive of peace between various industrial factions as actual competition between
the two boards for supremacy."
LaCross Telephone Corp. v. W.E.R.B., supra.
In the Garner case, supra, it was held that the
federal board had jurisdiction over the matter in dispute
because of potential conflict that might otherwise arise
between the state and federal governments. The court
stated:
"To avoid facing a conflict between the state
and federal remedies, we would have to assume
either that both authorities will always agree as
to whether the picketing should continue or that
the state's temporary injunction will be dissolved
as soon as the federal board acts. But experience
gives no assurance of either alternative and there
is no indication that the statute left it open for
such conflicts to arise."
In the Bethlehern, LaCross and Garner cases, supra,
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and in the case of Plankinton Packing Company v.
W.E.R.B., 338 U.S. 953, a direct or potential conflict of
federal and state action was involved, and there was no
declination of jurisdiction by the federal agency.
The doctrine of "irreconcilable conflict" was stated
by Mr. Chief Justice Hughes in the case of Kelly v.
Washington, 302 U.S. 1 (1937), as follows:
"When Congress does exercise its paramount
authority, it is obvious that Congress may deter..
mine how far its regulation shall go. There is no
constitutional rule which compels Congress to
occupy the whole field. Congress may circum..
scribe its regulation outside that limited field.
When it does so, state regulation outside that
limited field and otherwise admissible is not forbidden or displaced. The principle is thoroughly
established that the exercise by the state of its
police power, which would be valid if not super..
seded by federal action, is superseded only where
the repugnance or conflict is so 'direct and positive' that the two acts cannot 'be reconciled or
consistently stand together.' "
The case before this Court involves neither a poten..
tial nor direct and positive conflict of state-federal
power, and the rationale upon which state jurisdiction
was denied in the Bethlehem, Garner, LaCross and
Plo.nkinton cases is inapplicable here. In the February
1952 issue of Labor Law Journal, Philip Feldblum,
general counsel for the New York State Labor Relations
Board, in discussing "jurisdictional Tidelands in Labor
Relations" states :
"That rationale [irreconcilable conflict], how..
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ever, is inapplicable where the National Board has
declined to assert jurisdiction. In such situations,
there are no 'potentalities of conflict.' There can
be no dual assertion of jurisdiction leading to
vain action or mischievous conflict and no doubt
as to which board 'is the master.' Thus, there
is nothing in the decisions and rationale of the
Supreme Court which affirmatively bars the application of state power to labor disputes over
which the National Board declines to exercise
jurisdiction. On the contrary, ce~tain portions
of the Bethlehem opinion affirmatively indicate
the propriety of state action where federal power
is administratively withheld.
The Supreme Court in the Bethlehem case,
acknowledged that the field of labor relations
was not one in which the commerce clause itself pre-empted the field and precluded state
action. It recognized that labor relations traditionally were matters of local concern and interest, 'until recently' left entirely to state control, and not so 'intimately blended and intertwined with responsibilities of the national government that its nature alone raises an inference
of exclusion.' Pre-emption was implied only because of the 'potentialities of conflict' inherent
where the federal and state governments both
took hold of the same relationship. Where the
National Board as in the Bethelhem case, had
affirmatively asserted jurisdiction, the Court
could not 'deal with this as a case where federal
power has been delegated but lies dormant and
unexercised."
As was stated in the case of United Construction
Workers v. Laburnum Construction Corp., supra:

"* * * The care we took in the Garner Case to
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demonstrate the existing conflict between state
and federal administrative remedies in that case
was, itself, a recognition that if no conflict had
existed, the state procedure would have survived."
Applying the above reasoning the New York Labor
Board, in Raisch Motors v. New York S.L.R.B. (1955),
35 L.R.R.M. 1631, took jurisdiction of a case after the
National Labor Relations Board had declined jurisdiction. The New York Board stated :
"There is here no potential conflict, for there
is no due claim or assertion of jurisdiction. Thus
there is nothing which bars the application of
state power to take labor disputes over which
the National Board as here declines to assert
jurisdiction."
The New York Board urged:
"Where the National Board refuses to assert
jurisdiction, labor disputes must be subject to
regulation by the states, or they will not be regulated at all. Labor disputes may or may not
substantially affect interstate commerce, but they
invariably have an immediate and direct impact
upon the local community in which they occur. We
do not believe that Congress which granted the
National Board discretionary power to decline
jurisdiction ever intended to prevent the states,
when that occurs, from taking necessary steps to
protect their own safety, health and welfare."
Although not cited by appellants, we are aware of
the case of State v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 120 Utah
294, 233 P. 2d 685, decided by this Court in 1951. We
are in accord with the reasoning and result in that de-
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cision and mention it only to distinguish the issue there
presented. The Montgomery Ward case involved a conflict between the United States Labor l\ianagement Relations Act and the Utah statute, authorizing wage checkoffs,-differing from the problem in this instance where
there is neither an irreconcilable conflict or even a potential conflict between a federal and state statute or
federal and state action. The Montgomery Ward conclusion is therefore not applicable here.
In Bethlehem Steel Corporation v. New York Labor
Relations B oardJ supra, the court held:
"When federal administrative regulation
has been slight under a statute which potentially
allows minute and multitudinous regulations of
its subject, cf. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v.
Georgia, 234 US 280, 58 L. Ed. 1312, 34 S. Ct.
829, or even where extensive regulations have
been made, if the measure in question relates to
what may be considered a separable or distinct
segment of the matter covered by the federal
statute and the federal agency has not acted on
that segment, the case will be treated in a manner
similar to cases in which the effectiveness of
federal supervision awaits federal administrative
regulation, Northwestern Bell Teleph. Co. v. Nebraska State R. Commission, 297 US 471, 80 L.
Ed. 810, 56 S. Ct. 536, supra; H. P. Welch Co. v.
New Hampshire, 306 US 79, 83 L. Ed. 500, 59
S. Ct. 438, supra. The states are in those cases
permitted to use their police power in the interval. Terminal R. )Asso. v. ,Brotherhood of R.
Trainmen, 318 US 1, 87 L. Ed. 571, 63 S. Ct. 420."
In view of the above authorities it would seem, a fortiori,
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that where a federal agency has affirmatively declined
jurisdiction over a l~bor matter, the arguments for allowing state action would be even more convincing than
in the case where the federal administrative action
might have been taken, but was not. Whe~ffirmative
declination is made, it is certain that the Federal Government does not intend to occupy the area in question.
It has been held that if the Federal Government,
through 'Congress, has occupied a given field of regulation, a state may nonetheless exercise control until the
agency charged with enforcing. the federal regulations
acts to enforce its authority or jurisdiction thereunder.
As was stated in the case Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Larabee
Flour Mills, 211 U.S. 612 (1909):
"In other words, the mere grant by Congress
to the commission of certain national powers in
respect to interstate commerce does not of itself
and in the absence of action by the commission
interfere with the authority of the state to make
those regulations conducive to the welfare and
convenience of its citizens. Running through the
entire argument of counsel for the Missouri
Pacific is the thought that the control of Congress over interstate commerce and a delegation
of that control to a commission necessarily withdraws from the State all power in respect to
regulations of a local character. This proposition
cannot be sustained. Until specific action by Congress or the commission the control of the State
over these incidental matters remains undisturbed."
See also Termifnal R.R. Ass'n v. Brotherhood of R.R.
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Trainmen, 318 U.S. 1 (1943); H. P. Welch Co. v. New
Hampshire, 306 U.S. 79 (1939); Northwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Nebraska Ry. Comm'n., 297 lJ.S. 471 (1936),
and cited therein; M-L-T Ry. v. Harris, 234 U.S. 412
(1914); Preston, "Federal 'Pre-Emption' in Labor Relations, - A Reply to Professor Cox," 36 Chi. Bar Record
121 (Dec. 1954); "Labor Law-Federal-State Jurisdiction-A Pre-Emption Question," 27 Rocky Mountain
Law Review 330.
In view of the above authority, it is submitted that
action by an administrative agency, in effect, amounts
to action by Congress where Congress has empowered,
but not directed the N.L.R.B. to act in cases affecting
commerce. The National Labor Relations Board in
promulgating its juriHdictional yardsticks, therefore, has
marked the extent of congressional jurisdiction in that
area. The boards' standards should be given the same
effect in defining the limited area to be covered by the
federal statute as they would have been accorded had
they been included in the federal act at the time of its
enactment.
Respondents are aware of the fact that decisions
of administrative agencies do not have the stature efrr./
force of law that holdings of judicial tribunals are accorded. Nevertheless, very often the practical problems
that arise before federal and state agencies present
complex situations 'vhich that body has become skilled in
handling through its experience and constant attention
in a given field. For this reason we have included in our
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brief citations from state labor boards and the remarks
of federal and state labor board personnel.
In order to prevent the creation of a "no man's
land," the New York Labor Board and the Wisconsin
Board have recently taken cases affecting interstate
comn1erce following the National Labor Relations Board's
declination to assert its jurisdiction. See Raisch Motors
v. N.Y.S.L.R.B., supra.
The Wisconsin Board, 1n Copper v. Utter, 34
L.L.R.M. 1287, decided May 24, 1954, on the basis of the
Kinard case, supra, stated:
"Thus since the highest jurisdictional authority has not determined that state action would be
futile in the event the National Labor Relations
Board has refused to exercise jurisdiction, we
have therefore directed a representation election."
It is significant to point out that in N.Y.S.L.R.B. v.
Wags Transportation System, 130 N.Y. Supp. 2d 721,
cited by appellants, the affirmance of the lo"\\""er court's
denial of enforcement was on the limited ground that
there was no clear showing in that case that the National
Board would have rejected jurisdiction. Even in view
of the Wags decision, the Raisch Motors ruling by the
New York State Labor Board stands.
The National Labor Relations Board general counsel has asserted :
"In practice the board never has, and I think
I can confidently predict it never will interfere
to block state action in a situation where the board
23
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chooses to stay its hand because it believes the
impact of the activity on commerce would be insubstantial/'
* * * *
"Once it is recognized that Congress has
authorized the board at its discretion to withhold the full exercise of its jurisdiction, I cannot see any consideration of policy which makes
it necessary or desirable to exclude the states
from any field that the board properly abnegates
in this way."
(See address by N.L.R.B. General Counsel, George J.
Bott, May 13, 1954, cited in 34 L.R.R. pages 67-68.)
In the recent case of Weber v. Anheuser Bush, 99
L. Ed. 386, ______ U.S. ______ , Mr. Justice Frankfurter, writing the majority decision for an unanimous court, said,
in describing the ruling of the LaCrosse case (cited by
appellant) :
"The Federal Board's machinery for dealing
with certification problems also carries implications of exclusiveness, thus a State may not certify
a Union as the collective bargaining agent for
employees, where the Federal Board, if called
upon, would use its own certification procedure."
(E.mphasis added.)
While the Supreme Court does not answer the proposition squarely, respondents contend that the Weber holding gives an indication that probably the Supreme Court
will allow a state board to act if the National Labor Relations Board does not act.
State labor boards stand ready and willing to handle
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matters over which the National Labor Relations Board
has declined jurisdiction. In an address before the New
York State Federation of Labor, July 21, 1954, Jay
Kramer, Chairman of theN ew York Labor Board, stated:
"The relinquishment of jurisdiction by the
National Labor Relations Board * * * has vastly
expanded the sphere. of usefulness of the State
Labor Relations Board * * * . You should lmow
that this board stands ready and eager to handle
that increased case load and that we are prepared
to extend and maintain our contribution to collective bargaining, industrial peace and industrial growth in the Empire State."
(See 34 L.R.R. 261)
POINT· III
UNLESS THE STATE ACTS IN THIS INSTANCE, A
VACUUM IN THE LAW IS CREATED WHICH MAY RESULT IN ACTIVITIES PROHIBITED BY BOTH STATE
AND FEDERAL LAW.

Respondents are aware of the case of Retail Clerks
Local No. 1564 v. Your Food Stores, 225 F. 2d 659,
(1955), cited by appellants. With the results of that
decision we cannot agree, for to accept the conclusion
therein would be to perpetuate a vacuum in the field of
labor relations over which no legal authority would have
jurisdiction.
It would seem paradoxical to hold that because the
National Labor Relations Board once held an election
in the case before us, the Union is beyond the control of
the Utah State Labor Relations Board, because following that election the National Labor Relations Board
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declined to assert jurisdiction on the grounds that the
employer's business was predominantly local in character and would not add up to the standards necessary
to meet the National Board's test for invoking jurisdiction.
By its ruling on July 21, 1954, in declining the instant case, the National Labor Relations Board in effect
held that the employer's business impact on interstate
commerce is so trivial as to warrant leaving disputes
like it to local or state control.
While many management or labor groups might
argue the virtue of appellant's position, thereby purposely creating a "vacuum" in labor activities, the union
involved here prefers that all areas of labor-management relations be governed by rules of law and order.
To accept appellant's argument is to concede that under
the circumstances that were clearly demonstrated in
this case, a "no-man's land" must exist at a state level,
because the National Board refuses to act. Labor relations and industrial peace cannot exist in a void and
should not be governed by rules of the "jungle." A state's
failure to exercise iis jurisdiction might result in labormanagement activities, in the future, not regulated by
federal law, nevertheless prohibited by state law, that
would bar state enforcement and permit a climate of
industrial relations that runs contrary to all public
policy.
Conceivably either management or labor might from
time to time gain by the creation of a void in the labor
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field, but neither side could be totally immune from direct injury. The sword would cut both ways. But whether
management or labor could better its position in a "noman's" situation is of course of secondary importance.
Ultimate injury to the community must of necessity be
the primary concern. Public welfare, health and safety
have every thing to gain by an application of law and
order in this instance. The creation and perpetuation
of a labor relations "no-man's land" could produce nothing less than retrogression in the field of labor relations, with the resultant har1n reflected in the lives and
progress of a community.
It is inconceivable that the National Congress intended that a vacuum should result from an application
of federal labor legislation.
Respondents seek the Court's indulgence in summarizing its position by referring to a portion of an
article appearing in 50 North Western Law Review 190
(1955). A symposium, dealing with "National Labor
Relations Board Jurisdictional Standards and State
Jurisdiction" made the following lengthy, but convincing appraisal as follows:
"In light of the preemptive trend of the law
in this area, questions have naturally arisen as
to what rights, if any, the states now possess in
this 'tidelands' area which extends from the
farthest reach of the Board's power under the
Commerce Clause (the constitutional limitation)
inward to the new line drawn by the Board's
most recent, self-imposed jurisdictional 'yard-
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sticks' (the discretionary limitation). Must
it be assumed that where there has been a removal
of state power because of the pree1nptive effect
of the national act, followed by a refusal of the
National Board to exercise a part of this resulting power, it is necessary that a formal cession
agreement (the only express method of returning
power to the states recognized by the federal
act) be executed as a condition precedent to any
state agency stepping into the unoccupied area
thus created~ Or, to put it negatively, when the
National Board declines to exercise its exclusive
jurisdiction to any and, at the same time, has
not formally ceded its jurisdiction to any state
agency, is a 'no man's land' created wherein the
federal government will not act and the state
governments cannot act~
"The Supreme Court, although it has taken
notice of the problem, has expressly reserved
judgment until such time as the issue is squarely
presented to it.
"Should the Court eventually be required to
resolve the question, it would appear that implications arising from the express statutory provision for cession agreements would be the most
difficult obstacle for the proponents of state
power to overcome. Undoubtedly, it would be
persuasively argued that this statutory enactment
withdrew from the National Board any power to
cede jurisdiction to the states on its o"\vn terms,
substituting therefor the rigid express cession
agreement provisions of the act. Thus it could
be contended that if the Board, be merely declining to assert jurisdiction, could pave the way for
state action, the statutory requirement would be
rendered meaningless. Moreover, advocates of
complete federal preemption might justify the
28
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pjossibility of a resultant 'no man's land' by arguing that Congress was attempting to force the
adoption of state laws patterned after the national act and thus intentionally made conformity
the price which the states must pay if they wish
to take jurisdiction over disputes in the 'tidelands' area.
"However, the stronger arguments appear to
be on the side of those favoring state power.
Logically, it u·ottld seem that the statutory provision for cession agreements was intended to
apply only in those areas where the Board does
consistently assert jurisdiction, but where a quali-,
fied state agency, operating under labor legislation identical to the national act, is available
to assume a part of t~he burden. Only in that
situation, where the federal government clearly
wishes to have policies consonant with the national act applied, is the cession agreement necessary in order to avoid conflict and assure uniformity. In addition, it would appear that the
preemptive rationale of the Bethlehem, LaCrosse
and Garner cases, based as it is upon the fear of
potential conflict where there is concurrent jurisdiction, is also only applicable in those cases
where the National Board will assert its power
and does not extend to those disputes over which
the Board has said it will refuse jurisdiction.
"In the latter situations, there is no possibility of dual assertion of jurisdiction and hence
no danger of conflicting results.
"In addition, the following more general
arguments can be advanced as reasons for permitting state action:
"(1) The NLRA is based upon the federal
power to regulate interstate commerce. The Su29
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preme Court, in construing statutes enacted under the Commerce Clause, has stated that it will
find no suspension of the exercise of the reserve
powers of a state except so far as the Congressional intent to do so is clearly manifested. Since
there appears to be no clear manifestation of
Congressional will to prohibit the exercise of state
authority in the 'tidelands' area, the states should
be permitted to assert jurisdiction.
"(2) The Supreme Court has held that in
cases where federal administrative regulation is
slight, but extensive regulation would be aible,
or where regulation is more detailed,
the
federal agency has not acted in regard to a separable segment of the area covered by the federal
statute, the states may step in and exercise their
powers. If the Court will permit the states to
absorb the vacuum in these situations, there
would seem to be an even clearer case for the
exercise of state power where the federal agency
(the National Board here) has not only failed
to act but has expressly stated that it will not
act in regard to a distinct and separable segment
of the area covered by the federal act, such as
that created as a result of the Board's new jurisdictional policies.
"(3) Congress, in its original legislation in
this area, could have occupied only a limited area,
thereby leaving local and borderline cases to
state regulation. Rather than directly exercise
this line-drawing power, however, Congress left
it to the Board in the form of a statutory provision empowering, but not directing the Board to
act in cases affecting commerce. Thus, the Nationa! Board, in exercising this discretion, is
actually filling in the details of the Congressional
policy. The Board's jurisdictional standards
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should therefore be accorded the sanae effect, in
thus naarking off the linaited area to be covered
by the federal act, that they would have received
had they been included in the federal act at the
time of its passage.
"It thus appears that the various legal arguments available weigh heavily in favor of the
exercise of state power in the 'tidelands' area.
Moreover, policy considerations would seem to
motivate against the creation of a 'no man's land'
wherein labor disputes, not of sufficient importance to warrant National Board attention, but
nonetheless a source of real concern to the communities in which they occur, would be totally unregulated. It would therefore appear that should
this important question reach the Suprenae Court,
a decision favoring the assertion of state powers
could probably be anticipated." (Enaphasis added.)
CONCLUSION
In view of the foregoing argument and authority,
respondents urge that this Court affirm the Utah State
Labor Relations Board's order in full, naake such other
appropriate order as will enforce the board's decree,
and grant such further relief as is just under the premIses.
Respectfully submitted,
E. R. CALLISTER
Attorney General
RAYMOND W. GEE
Assistant Attorney General
A. W. SANDACK
Attorneys for Respondents
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